Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning Malware Models via
  Reinforcement Learning by Anderson, Hyrum S. et al.
Learning to Evade Static PE Machine Learning Malware Models
via Reinforcement Learning
Hyrum S. Anderson
Endgame, Inc.
hyrum@endgame.com
Anant Kharkar
University of Virginia
agk7uc@virginia.edu
Bobby Filar
Endgame, Inc.
bfilar@endgame.com
David Evans
University of Virginia
evans@virginia.edu
Phil Roth
Endgame, Inc.
proth@endgame.com
ABSTRACT
Machine learning is a popular approach to signatureless malware
detection because it can generalize to never-before-seen malware
families and polymorphic strains. This has resulted in its practi-
cal use for either primary detection engines or for supplementary
heuristic detection by anti-malware vendors. Recent work in adver-
sarial machine learning has shown that deep learning models are
susceptible to gradient-based attacks, whereas non-differentiable
models that report a score can be attacked by genetic algorithms
that aim to systematically reduce the score. We propose a more
general framework based on reinforcement learning (RL) for at-
tacking static portable executable (PE) anti-malware engines. The
general framework does not require a differentiable model nor does
it require the engine to produce a score. Instead, an RL agent is
equipped with a set of functionality-preserving operations that
it may perform on the PE file. Through a series of games played
against the anti-malware engine, it learns which sequences of op-
erations are likely to result in evading the detector for any given
malware sample. This enables completely black-box attacks against
static PE anti-malware, and produces functional evasive malware
samples as a direct result. We show in experiments that our method
can attack a gradient-boosted machine learning model with eva-
sion rates that are substantial and appear to be strongly dependent
on the dataset. We demonstrate that attacks against this model
appear to also evade components of publicly hosted antivirus en-
gines. Adversarial training results are also presented: by retraining
the model on evasive ransomware samples, a subsequent attack
is 33% less effective. Importantly, we release an OpenAI gym to
allow researchers to study evasion rates against their own machine
learning models, malware samples, and their own RL agents. We
also outline practical limitations with this approach that we hope
will beneficial to future research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Machine learning offers an attractive tool for antivirus vendors
for both primary detection engines and supplementary detection
heuristics. Supervised learning models automatically summarize
complex relationships among features in the training dataset that
are discriminating between malicious and benign labels. Further-
more, properly regularized machine learning models generalize to
new samples whose features and labels follow the same distribution
as the training data set.
However, motivated and sophisticated adversaries intentionally
seek to evade antivirus engines, be they signature-based or other-
wise. In the context of a machine learning model, an attacker’s aim
is to discover and exploit a set of features that the model deems dis-
criminating, but may not be a causal indicator of benign behavior.
The attacker attempts to camouflage the malware in feature space
by inducing a feature representation that is highly correlated with,
but not necessarily indicative of benign behavior.
In this paper, we present a reinforcement learning (RL) approach
to learn to bypass machine learning antivirus models based on static
features. Static detection of malware is an important protection
layer in security suites because it allows malicious files to be de-
tected prior to execution. Our intent in attacking machine learning
malware models is two-fold: to provide an automated framework
to summarize the weaknesses of an anti-malware engine, and to
produce functioning evasive malware samples that can be used to
augment a machine learning model in adversarial training [12]. We
focus on static Windows PE malware evasion that presents some
unique challenges for a realistic implementation. However, much of
our contributions could be applied to other static machine learning
malware detection engines, including PDFs, Mach-O binaries, ELF
binaries, etc. Our implementation is released as an open source
Open-AI gym [4] to enable other researchers to use, adapt, and
improve upon this generic approach.
Several recent works have proposed methods for attacking mal-
ware machine learning models in information security [2, 13, 14,
21, 33]. We present relevant background information, including a
review of related work, in Section 2. Unique to our RL approach
include (1) the ability to generate functioningWindows PEmalware
as part of the attack process, which is not possible using gradient-
based approaches except under strict and sometimes unrealistic
assumptions, (2) the ability to attack a black-box model that does
not report a score, and (3) creation of an RL model that can be
used to create evasive malware variants from samples not used
during training. We previously released a whitepaper [1] that ini-
tially demonstrated these results. This paper provides additional
insight into that work, extends results, and points out limitations
discovered since the whitepaper release.
Contributions. The main contributions of this paper include:
• We present (Section 3) a generic black-box attack on static
PE malware detection. It assumes no knowledge of the
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malware model’s features or its structure, and requires
only the ability to retrieve a malicious/benign label (no
score required) for an arbitrary input. Our attack is based
on reinforcement learning, and represents a new direction
in automatic evasion research.
• We demonstrate evading a machine learning model in Sec-
tion 4 with results presented in Section 5.
• We test in Section 5 whether adversarially-crafted mali-
cious samples can be used to harden a machine learning
model via adversarial training. In particular, by retraining
a machine learning model using evasive ransomware vari-
ants, the evasion rate of a new ransomware attack drops
from 12% to 8%.
• We release code1 in the form of an OpenAI Gym [4] for
malware manipulation that may be used by both machine
learning and security researchers.
• Importantly, we point out current practical limitations of
this framework first presented in [1], that include chal-
lenges in guaranteeing functionality of evasive variants,
and challenges in using evasive variants for adversarial
re-training.
2 BACKGROUND
This section provides background and summarizes related work
in machine learning malware detection and evasion. Section 2.1
reviews some common considerations for statically classifying PE
files as malicious or benign using supervised learning. In Section 2.2,
we review approaches that have been demonstrated in the literature
to attack machine learning models in information security.
2.1 Static PE Malware Detection
Static malware detection attempts to classify samples as malicious
or benign without executing them, in contrast to dynamic malware
detection which detects malware based on is runtime behavior
including time-dependent sequences of system calls for analysis [3,
8, 22]. Although static detection is well-known to be undecidable
in general [6], it is an important protection layer in a security suite
because when successful, it allows malicious files to be detected
prior to execution.
Machine learning-based static PE malware detectors have been
used since at least 2001 [27], and owing largely to the structured file
format and backwards-compatibility requirements, many concepts
remain surprisingly similar in subsequent works [8, 16, 24, 26, 28].
Schultz et al. [27] assembled a dataset and generated labels by run-
ning through a McAfee virus scanner. PE files were represented
by features that included imported functions, strings and byte se-
quences. Various machine learning models were trained and val-
idated on a holdout set. Models included rules induced from RIP-
PER [7], naïve Bayes and an ensemble classifier. Kolter et al. [16]
extended this approach by including byte-level N-grams, and em-
ployed techniques from natural language processing, including tf-
idf weighting of strings. Shafiq et al. [28] proposed using just seven
features from the PE header, including DebugSize, user-definable
ImageVersion, ResourceSize, and virtual size of the second listed sec-
tion, motivated by the fact that malware samples typically exhibit
1https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware
those elements. Saxe and Berlin leveraged novel two dimensional
byte entropy histograms that is fed into a multi-layer neural net-
work for classification [26].
Recent advances in end-to-end deep learning have dramatically
improved the state of the art especially in object classification,
machine translation and speech recognition. In many of these ap-
proaches, raw images, text or speech waveforms are used as input
to a machine learning model which infers the most useful feature
representation for the task at hand. However, despite successes
in other domains hand-crafted features apparently still represent
the state of the art for malware detection in published literature.
The state of the art may change to end-to-end deep learning in the
ensuing months or years, but hand-crafted features derived from
parsing the PE file may continue to be relevant indefinitely because
of the structured format.
2.2 Evading Machine Learning Models
An attacker may successfully evade machine learning models under
a variety of conditions, which may include the following.
(1) Concept drift: an attacker exploits the fact that a model has
been trained to approximate p(x,y), but that the concept of
malicious vs. benign has since drifted to (or has always ac-
tually been represented by) a different distribution pˆ(x,y).
(2) Modeling error: an attacker exploits the fact that a dis-
criminative model approximates the true posterior p(y |x)
as pˆ(y |x), and discovers an evasive variant x∗ for which
p(y = malicious|x∗) > η, but pˆ(y = malicious|x∗) < η for
some chosen threshold η.
(3) Bayes error rate: even for perfect pˆ(x,y) = p(x,y), there is
lower bound on the error rate that can be achieved by
any machine learning model. This rate is greater than
zero whenever the class-conditional likelihoods p(x|y =
malicious) and p(x|y = benign) overlap. This means that
there is irreducible error in any model, and a subsequent
tradeoff between false positive and false negative rate. Be-
cause of this, in machine learning malware classifiers, the
threshold η is often set conservatively to avoid false posi-
tives due to the base rate of benign samples. (A normally
low FP rate may still induce an overwhelming number
of false positives due to the high extremely large propor-
tion of benignware on a customer system.) Irreducible er-
ror presents an attack surface for evasion by x∗ by ex-
ploiting conservative thresholds η: p(y = malicious|x∗)
< η, even though the true likelihoods may dictate that
p(x∗ |y = malicious) < p(x∗ |y = benign).
Bayes error rate may be best reduced by feature engineering that
creates more separable class-conditional distributions, but generally
cannot be practically reduced to zero.Modeling error can be reduced
significantly reduced by laborious dataset curation and labeling,
disciplined model selection, and techniques such as adversarial
training to proactively discover and remedy modeling error. To
some extent, adversarial training can also protect against concept
drift, in the sense that it hardens a machine learning model against
worst-case inputs.
Several recent works have addressed attacking machine learn-
ing classifiers for malware. We group them into three categories
according to the amount of information available to the attacker:
(1) Direct gradient-based attacks in which the model must be
fully differentiable and the structure and weights must
be known by the attacker. Poplar models that defined by
differential objective functions include logistic regression,
support vector machines, and neural networks (deep learn-
ing). Given the model architecture and parameters/weights,
the attacker can essentially query the model directly to
determine how to most increase the model’s loss function
(crudely, how best to bypass the model).
(2) White-box attacks against models that report a maliciousness
score. The attacker has no knowledge about the model
structure, but has unlimited access to probe the model and
may be able to use heuristics that take advantage of the
revealed scores to search for evasive variants. Virtually
every machine learning model can produce a score given
a query, but deployed models often choose a threshold on
that score to determine malicious / benign.
(3) Binary black-box attacks. The attacker has no knowledge
about the model, but has unlimited access to probe the
model. The model output is a single bit indicating whether
the sample is considered benign or malicious.
2.2.1 Direct gradient-based attacks. Gradients from a model un-
der attack provide extremely powerful clues to the attacker, which
several attacks can exploit to find evasive variants.
The first approach, introduced by Szegedy et al. [30], is to perturb
the sample x in the direction that would most increase the loss
function J (x;θ ),
x∗ = x + σ (∇x J (x;θ )) (1)
The vector function σ (·) is a domain-specific mapping of the in-
put back to the range of acceptable objects. For example, the Fast
Gradient Sign method uses σ (δ ) = ϵ · sgn(δ ) so that the pertur-
bation is imperceptible, maximally bounded by a change of ϵ to
any one pixel [12]. In general, the aim of these approaches is to
affect a change in the sample so that the the label f (x) predicted by
the model changes with some “minor” perturbation that keeps the
new sample x + δ in the domain D of “valid” objects (e.g., human-
imperceptible or functioning executable file). For an energy surface
J (f (x),y;θ ) minimized during model training, an adversarial ex-
ample attempts to discover
arg min
δ
J (f (x + δ ) , y¯;θ )
s.t. x + δ ∈ D
y , y¯.
Grosse et al. attack a deep learning Android malware model
using gradient perturbation method [13]. The feature vector x ∈
{0, 1}545333 is a large sparse binary vector. It is perturbed in a way
that bounds the total number of changes (using an ℓ1 constraint as
a convex proxy to ℓ0). Furthermore, σ (·) is implemented as an index
set that allows features to be added (never removed), and only if
they do not interfere with other features that are already present
in the application. The authors report evasion efficacy from 50% to
84%, depending on the model architecture. Since the work performs
the attack only in feature space, malicious files are never generated
during this process, however, and the attack assumes there is a way
to generate a sample that matches any feature vector.
A second class of gradient-based attacks connects the model un-
der attack to a generator model in a generative adversarial network
(GAN) [11]. Unlike perturbation methods, the generator learns to
generate a completely novel sample from a random seed. Through
a series of adversarial rounds, the generator learns to produce sam-
ples that appear to be drawn from the benign class-conditional
distribution pˆ(x|y = benign) that has been estimated by the model
under attack (the discriminator in GAN literature).
Like the perturbation method, a mapping function may be re-
quired to ensure that generated samples constitute acceptable ob-
jects. For images, this step is typically ignored. For malware, the
mapping onto legitimate PE files that perform the desired malicious
function is essential, but has yet to studied in the general case.
Anderson et al. [2] apply this GAN-based attack to a detector of
domain generation algorithm (DGA) domains, which attempts to
distinguish human-crafted from algorithmically-generated domain
names. The only constraint on generated domain names is that
they contain valid characters, which are trivially encoded into the
alphabet of tokens in the neural network. As such, the mapping
into “legitimate” characters is automatically encoded.
2.2.2 Attacks without gradients. A less powerful attacker has
no direct access to the model, which is necessary for the gradient
attacks, but can interact with themodel as a black-box that produces
a score for any query. This score allows an attacker to directly
measure (myopically) the efficacy of any single perturbation.
Xu et al. [33] leverage the score reported by PDF malware classi-
fiers to derive a fitness function for a genetic programming frame-
work. To ensure that mutations preserve the desired malicious
behavior, an oracle is used to compare the runtime behavior with
that of the original seed. The authors utilize the Cuckoo sandbox as
an oracle, and note how it is computationally expensive. The genetic
algorithm found nearly 17K evasive variants from 500 malicious
seeds, and achieved 100% evasion rate against both the PDFrate
and Hidost malware classifiers.
Recently, Huang et al.[15] demonstrated a white-box attack for
Windows PE files, where the feature vector is known to be a binary
indicator of static imports.
2.2.3 Binary black-box attacks. Finally, in the most generic at-
tack, the anti-malware engine reports only malicious or benign
for an input. This is the minimum output an on-line classification
service could provide, so represents the most challenging scenario
for an attacker.
Dang et al. [9] attack PDF malware classifiers using only their
binary malicious/benign decision. The authors design a scoring
function that can assign real-value scores to reflect evasion progress
for a given sample. The scoring function is composed of only binary
outcomes obtained from themodel under attack and validation from
an oracle that ensures that the behavior of the morphed sample re-
mains unchanged. This scoring mechanism produces a real-valued
objective that can be algorithmically exploited via a hill-climbing
approach. The idea is to measure the number of morphing steps
required to change the detector’s label without modifying behavior
measured by the oracle. In experiments, authors effectively morph
100% of the test samples to evade the classifiers by this approach.
Required for this approach are the model to attack, an oracle to
verify that malicious behavior has been preserved, and a mutation
engine. In summary, this approach aims to trade the binary black
box problem with a score-producing black box problem.
Recently, Hu and Tan [14] introduced MalGAN to generate PE
malware to bypass a black-box static PE malware engine. The idea
is simple: instead of attacking the black box directly, the attacker
creates a fully-differentiable surrogate model trained to reproduce
outputs observed by probing the target model with corresponding
inputs. Then, the surrogate model is used for gradient computa-
tion in a modified GAN to produce evasive malware variants. The
authors report 100% efficacy in bypassing the target model, and
furthermore, demonstrate that retraining with the adversarial ex-
amples has limited efficacy.
The approach takes advantage of the cross-evasion property,
previously observed for computer-vision models [20]. But the lat-
ter work leverages a more straightforward gradient perturbation
method to generate samples adversarial to the surrogate model.
These evaded the target models with high probability. One could
reasonably apply the same approach to PE malware evasion, except
for the difficulty in ensuring the file format and malware func-
tion have been preserved through an appropriate mapping as in
Equation 1.
A notable limitation of Hu and Tan’s approach is that the attacker
must know the complete feature space of the target model [14]. The
substitute model is trained and GAN attack is carried out in this
feature space. The authors argue that the feature space may be
discovered by the attacker, and use only imported functions in their
evaluations.
Rosenberg et al. recently reported a black-box attack against
dynamic machine learning models that leverage recursive neural
networks as a basis [25]. The model under attack is known to use
sequences of API calls (as observed in a sandbox, for example) to
determine whether a sample is malicious. As with Hu and Tan [14],
a surrogate model is leveraged as the target for the attack. As part of
the attack, the authors do not modify existing API calls, but insert
chaff API calls that do not change the functionality of the malware.
They demonstrate that adversarial sequences found against the
surrogate model bypass the original model with 100% evasion rate.
2.2.4 How our work differs. We target the most challenging sce-
nario for an attacker, where there are limitations on the information
available to an attacker:
(1) The output from the target classifier is strictly Boolean,
declaring only whether a sample is deemed benign or ma-
licious by the classifier.
(2) The feature space and structure of the target classifier are
completely unknown.
(3) There does not exist an external party (such as an oracle) to
guarantee that a sample is valid. Thus, there is no mapping
function to the space of legitimate PE files.
Furthermore, we show how the attacker may create an evasion
model that can be applied to new malware samples not available
during training. This is in contrast to algorithmic approaches that
operate on a fixed population of malware samples.
These restrictions present what we believe is the most difficult
(but also most realistic) black-box evasion scenario for static Win-
dows PE malware detectors. As a result of the limited information
available to the attacker, evasion rates are significantly lower than
those of the approaches above. However, we believe this study
most closely follows approaches used by real-world adversaries—
systematically probing anti-malware engines in an attempt to cap-
ture and summarize blind spots—but accomplishes it at greater
scale. Furthermore, since our ultimate goal is to harden machine
learning models against adversarial evasion attacks, one may as-
sume that our automated adversary is at least as capable as the
most realistic threat for static Windows PE files, and thus use the
generated adversarial samples for model hardening.
Importantly, our approach begins with a pool of malicious PE
files and attempts binary manipulations that create an evasive vari-
ant. To our knowledge, our approach is the only work to date that
produces valid PE malware samples. (The genetic programming
approach used by Xu et al. [33] produces valid PDF malware sam-
ples.) These samples can be explicitly used by any machine learning
model for model hardening, without respect to differences in feature
representations used by each model.
3 METHOD
We implement our black-box attack using a reinforcement learning
approach [29]. Section 3.1 provides a brief introduction to reinforce-
ment learning. Then, we following sections explain how we apply
it to find evasive Windows PE malware.
3.1 Reinforcement Learning
A reinforcement learning model consists of an agent and an envi-
ronment that interact for a sequence of turns (or discrete timesteps).
For each turn t , an agent may choose an action at ∈ A based on a
policy π (a|st ) and an observable environmental state vector st . The
environment produces a reward rt ∈ R in response to a chosen ac-
tion as well as new environmental state vector st+1. The reward rt
and observed state of the environment st+1 are fed back to the agent
to choose a new action based on policy π (a |st+1). The agent learns
incrementally through a trade-off of exploration and exploitation
which actions to produce given the environment’s state. The reward
provides the key objective for learning, and notably, may be zero for
many turns until a target state is reached through a relatively long
series of actions. The goal of the agent is to derive a policy that max-
imizes the expected return defined by V π (st ) = Eat [Qπ (st , at )|st ]
with Qπ (st , at ) = Est+1:∞,at+1:∞ [Rt |st , at ] and Rt =
∑
i≥0 γ irt+i
where γ ∈ [0, 1] discounts the amount of reward from future ac-
tions. Early actions that produce no immediate reward but are
important to the final outcome are promoted via V π that predicts
the long-term reward for a given state. This function that estimates
the expected utility of taking a given action for a given state is
called a Q-function.
Deep reinforcement learning was introduced as a framework
to play Atari games by reinforcement agents that often exceed
human performance [18, 19]. Among the key contributions of the
deep reinforcement learning framework was its ability, as in deep
learning, for the agent to learn a value function in an end-to-end
way: it takes raw pixels as input, and outputs predicted rewards for
Figure 1: Markov decision process formulation of the mal-
ware evasion reinforcement learning problem.
each action. This learned value function is the basis for so-called
deep Q-learning, where the Q-function is learned and refined over
hundreds of games.
More recently, an actor-critic model with experience replay
(ACER) has achieved state of the art performance on a series of
Atari tasks. The model’s stability and sample efficiency are notable.
In particular, ACER utilizes a deep neural network to learn both
a policy model π and a Q-function to estimate the state-action
value for each state. Experience replay is used to help the agent
efficiently learn these models from relatively few experiences. For
further information about classical actor critic models, and for re-
cent advances in ACER models, the reader is referred to [17] and
[32], respectively.
In our experiments, we train an ACER agent to learn a policy for
our framework depicted in Figure 1. In the Markov decision process
shown, the agent gets an estimate of the environment’s state s ∈ S,
represented by a feature vector s of themalware sample (which need
not correspond to any internal representation of the malware by the
anti-malware engine). The Q-function and action policy determine
what action to take. In our framework, the actions spaceA consists
of a set of modifications to the PE file that (a) do not break the
PE file format, and (b) do not alter the intended functionality of
the malware sample. The reward function is measured by the anti-
malware engine, which is converted to a reward: 0 if the modified
malware sample is judged to be malicious (no evasion), and R if it
is deemed to be benign (evasion). The reward and state are then
fed back into the agent.
3.2 Implementation
With an aim to engage the broader community, we implement our
malware evasion environment as an extensible OpenAI gym [5],
which we release at https://github.com/endgameinc/gym-malware.
The gym framework has become popular for training RL agents
because it provides a standardized environment to produce bench-
marks (like playing Atari games). We adopt some game-playing
terminology in some of our description below. In addition, we re-
lease a default ACER agent using chainer-rl [31]. PE file parsing
and manipulation leverages the Library to Instrument Executable
Formats [23].
The environment consists of an initial malware sample (one
malware sample per “game”), and a customizable anti-malware
engine (the attack target). Each step or turn provides the following
feedback to the agent:
• A reward value ∈ {0,R}, where 0 denotes the malware
sample was detected by the anti-malware engine and R is
the reward given for evading the engine. In our gym and
in experiments, we use R = 10.
• A feature vector summarizing the state of the environment
(malware sample). The feature vector is described in further
detail below.
Based on this feedback, the agent chooses from a set of mutations
(actions) that preserve the format and function of the PE file. We
describe our initial implementation of each of these components
below.
3.3 Environment
The malware sample exists as raw bytes in the game environment.
However, in order to more concisely represent the current state of
the malware sample, the environment emits the state in the form
of a feature vector. In our experiments, we use a 2350-dimensional
feature vector comprised of the following general categories of
features:
• PE header metadata
• Section metadata: section name, size and characteristics
• Import and Export Table metadata
• Counts of human readable strings (e.g. file paths, URLs,
and registry key names)
• Byte histogram
• 2D byte-entropy histogram (as used by Saxe and Berlin [26])
For feature sets which are countably infinite (section names,
imported function names, etc.), we use the hashing trick to collapse
into them into a vector of fixed size. The resulting feature vector
represents a fairly holistic view of the malware sample, and en-
capsulates elements used by machine learning malware models in
industry and academia [8, 16, 24, 26, 28].
These features can be inspected in the accompanying code, and
we note that they can be applicable both to training a machine
learning malware detector, as well as for our use in summarizing a
malware sample that comprises our “state” in the Markov decision
process.
3.4 Action Space
As mentioned above, the file mutations represent the actions or
moves available to the agent within the environment. There are a
modest number of modifications that can be made to a PE file that
do not break the PE file format and do not alter code execution.
Each of these can be inspected in detail in the published code. Some
of these include:
• adding a function to the import address table that is never
used (this is the sole manipulation explored by Hu and
Tan [14])
• manipulating existing section names
• creating new (unused) sections
• appending bytes to extra space at the end of sections
• creating a new entry point which immediately jumps to
the original entry point
• removing signer information
• manipulating debug info
• packing or unpacking the file
• modifying (breaking) header checksum
• appending bytes to the overlay (end of PE file)
Note that most of these functions are stochastic in nature. For
example, when renaming a section, a new section name is drawn
uniformly from a list of section names found in benign files. When
appending bytes to the end of a section or file, the length and
entropy of of the appended bytes can be specified, but for simplicity,
are chosen at random by the agent. Likewise, the compression level
used by the packer is chosen at random.
The stochastic nature of the manipulations was chosen for sim-
plicity to reduce an exponentially large number of mutations to a
few dozen stochastic actions. The idea is that the agent may now
choose actions that modify broad elements of a PE file which are
generally used by static machine learning malware models. An
alternative is to unroll the limited number of actions into hundreds
of specific actions (e.g., rename section .wah to .blah, instead of
renaming randomly). However, reinforcement learning with ex-
tremely large action spaces is a subject of ongoing research [10].
4 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In our experiments, we attack a gradient boosted decision tree
model trained on 100,000 malicious and benign samples, and which
achieves an area under the receiver operating characteristic score
(ROC-AUC) of 0.993. In our experiments, we set a threshold of 0.9
for the static malware model that approximately corresponds to
a 1% false positive rate at a 90% true positive rate. This model is
included in the code that we release.
Although not strictly necessary, for convenience, we train the
agent on the features used to represent the state of the environ-
ment. We expect this to produce more generous results than can be
expected in practice. However, as our intent is to release a toolkit
for learning malware manipulating agents, this proof of concept
suffices for our purposes. In general, we postulate that the agent’s
learning problem is simpler when each of the following conditions
hold: (1) the feature representation used by the model under at-
tack has significant overlap with the features used by the agent
to represent the malware state, (2) the agent’s actions are fully
observable by the state representation—that is, the agent can “see”
via his feature representation the effect of his actions, and (3) the
agent’s actions can affect with reasonable granularity any part of
the feature vector used by the model under attack.
Our preliminary experiments involved our basic chainer-rl actor-
critic model agent tested in our OpenAI gym. The agent utilizes
a Boltzman exploration / exploitation strategy, in which muta-
tions are drawn proportionally to their expected Q-value. The
agent is allowed to perform up to ten mutations before declar-
ing failure (i.e., ten rounds with exactly one mutation per round).
The relatively few number of mutations allows is motivated by
a few considerations. First, long sequences of moves that finally
produce a reward can lead to complications in training the re-
inforcement learning agent (the credit assignment problem). Sec-
ondly, we wish to keep the spirit of adversarial perturbations, in
which the “size” of the perturbation is relatively small. This is
important in our domain because degenerate sequences such as
add_section, add_section, add_section, . . . , add_sectionmay
indeed bypass the classifier, but also represents a new signature
that is fairly indicative of having been produced by our automated
method. In preliminary experiments, we found that allowing for
long sequences could promote these degenerate sequences against
our particular model. An alternative approach would be to regu-
larize the entropy of the action space, which we did not deeply
explore.
The “game” is comprised of several rounds. Each round begins
with a known malware sample, which is modified through a series
of mutations in the round. Rounds terminate early if the agent
bypasses the malware model prior to the ten allotted mutations
(i.e., the agent was bypassed in less than ten mutations). We allow
a combined total of 50,000 mutations to train each model.
For the black box attack, rewards of R = 10 or R = 0 are provided
for evasion or failed-evasion, respectively. For comparison, we use
an attack in the same environment using randomized action with
no RL agent.
5 RESULTS
We train four separate agents that differ only in the malware sam-
ples used as seeds for evading the machine learning model. In
particular, we train an agent on the following datasets consisting
of the following samples:
• 50K randomly selected malware samples from Virus Share,
• 2.6K ransomware samples downloaded from VirusTotal,
• 1.6K Virut samples downloaded from VirusTotal, and
• 4.1K BrowseFox (adware) samples downloaded from Virus-
Total.
For each of these datasets, we set aside 200 samples for a holdout
validation set, and use the remaining samples for training the RL
agent.
During training of the reinforcement learning agent, we save
malware samples that result in an evasion. The number of evasive
variants discovered during training with a fixed budget of 50K
mutations are summarized for each category in Table 1. Note that
during training, if the machine learning model classifies the original
malware seed as benign, the sample is skipped and not included in
our analysis.
Generalization. We wish to determine how well the trained rein-
forcement learning agent can generalize to samples never before
seen. After an agent is trained, we measure performance on 200
holdout samples that have been withheld from both the malware
detector training and the agent’s training. In particular, for each
of the 200 samples in each dataset, we use the trained agent to
dataset evasions (% of budget)
VirusShare 2085 (4.2%)
ransomware 1543 (3.1%)
Virut 619 (1.2%)
BrowseFox (adware) 2444 (4.9%)
Table 1: Number of evasive variants found during training,
where we gave the agent a budget of 50K mutations.
dataset agent random
VirusShare 24% 23%
ransomware 12% 9%
Virut 10% 9%
BrowseFox (adware) 19% 18%
Table 2: Evasion rate on 200 holdout samples. A samples is
included in the calculation only if the classifier correctly
identified the original sample as malicious.
dataset agent random
VirusShare upx_pack (2) upx_pack (2)
ransomware section_rename (1) imports_append (1.5)
Virut upx_pack (4) upx_pack (5.5)
BrowseFox (adware) upx_pack (1.5) upx_pack (2.5)
Table 3: Dominant successful mutations seleted by the RL
agent and by the randompolicy. Shown in parentheses is the
median number of mutations required for successful eva-
sion.
manipulate the sample (up to 10 mutations), and check whether
any subsequence of mutations results in an invasive variant. As
with the training, if the original malware sample is misclassified as
benign, the sample is skipped and not included in our analysis.
We compare evasion rates by the reinforcement learning to a
random uniform exploration policy: up to 10 mutations per samples
are chosen at random from the set of possible actions. Results are
summarized in Table 2.
Dominant mutations. We summarize in Table 3 the dominant
mutations selected by both the agent and by the random policy for
the holdout samples that successfully evaded the machine learning
model. Note that the both the agent and random policy found the
the machine learning malware model struggles with upx_pack.
However, note that agent generally exploits this blind spot in a
fewer number of moves, as denoted by the median number of moves
used in a successful evasion in the table.
Cross-evasion. We uploaded samples produced by the reinforce-
ment learning agent to VirusTotal, and found that the median detec-
tion ratio dropped when compared to the detection ratio from the
original sample. We emphasize that VirusTotal does not represent
the full detection platform for vendors in VirusTotal; nevertheless,
the drop in detection rate does demonstrate that by bypassing a
relatively simple machine learning model, cross-evasion of com-
mercial products may be possible. For comparison, we also test
dataset original agent original random
VirusShare 54/65 26/65 54/65 16/65
ransomware 52.5/65 16.5/65 44.5/65 9.5/65
Virut 57/65 25/65 56.5/65 20/65
BrowseFox (adware) 49/65 18/65 49/65 21/65
Table 4: Cross-evasion rates on 200 holdout samples, show-
ing the median number of VirusTotal detections before and
after mutation using agent mutations and random muta-
tions.
the cross-evasion efficacy of random mutations on the same data,
which surprisingly, is similarly effective at evading a host of anti-
virus solitions on VirusTotal. A summary of cross-evasion efficacy
is shown in Table 4. Apparently, a host of AV scanners in VirusTotal
are susceptible to mutations of malware samples.
Model hardening. To test whether a model can be hardened by
adversarial training, we took the 1543 samples discovered during
training of the ransomware dataset and add them to the 100K train-
ing set of the original GBDT model and retrained. We then used
the previously-trained reinforcement learning agent to manipulate
the 200 holdout samples (which neither agent or model have seen)
and test the evasion efficacy of the retrained model. In this case,
the reinforcement learning agent successfully discovered evasive
variants for 8% (down from 12%) of the samples, a drop of 33%. It is
important to reiterate that the attack efficacy is measured only on
malware samples that the machine learning model initially labels
as malicious. In this way, we have tried to decouple the fact that the
“hardened” machine learning malware model (trained on generic
malware samples) might merely be more aware of ransomware
samples, rather than aware of blind spots in the model.
Shortcomings and open challenges. These black-box evasion and
hardening results are modest compared to other gradient-based and
white-box attacks. Furthermore, upon close inspection of samples,
we discovered the following, which we describe for future work:
(1) For a random sampling of ten evasive variants generated
from the VirusShare dataset, we discovered that only
eight executed properly in a virtual machine. This was
troubling, since our approach was based on the “functional
by construction” assumption that mutations preserve for-
mat and function. In corresponding with authors of the
library we use for binary manipulation [23], has lead us
to believe that while the mutations themselves should pre-
serve function and format, they may not respect certain
obfuscation tricks or less common uses of the PE file for-
mat. For example, putty.exe uses LEA instructions in the
import address table, so that patching with our approach
would also require patching assembly code after the table
is rebuilt. Furthermore, malware may intentionally exploit
lazy parsing by the Windows loader to remain functional
(e.g., section sizes), while enjoying some degree of anti-
tampering by technically violating the PE standard that
parsers rely on. In this case, our file manipulations that
require parsing do not practically work since the parsed
file is already invalid prior to employing the manipulation.
One workaround for this issue is to begin with a pool of
malware samples that are known to parse correctly.
(2) We demonstrated that after adversarial training, a new
model was hardened to a subsequent adversarial attack.
However, on close inspection, we observed that the library
we use for binary manipulation [23] leaves unique fin-
gerprints in samples it modifies. For example, although
section names are in large part arbitrary, the model we
use in this paper relies on section names to build evidence
of malicious vs. benign. In file modified by LIEF, one sees
uncommon section names like .l1 and .l2 that are id-
iosyncratic. A danger of adversarial training with these
samples is that the model begins to learn the difference
between “modified by LIEF” and “not modified by LIEF”,
rather than “malicious” and “benign”.
For other researchers pursuing this line of research, we strongly
caution an investigation into these matters, which is outside the
scope of this research.
6 DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated a generic black-box attack based on rein-
forcement learning against Windows PE machine learning mod-
els. This represents a new direction in automatic evasion research.
Unique to our approach include the following.
• The attacker requires no knowledge about the model under
attack.
• The RL agent can generalize: it can modify new malware
samples to bypass the model it was trained against.
• We believe our approach to be the first to automatically
create novel Windows PE evasive malware variants by
modifying binary files.
We also demonstrated on a ransomware dataset that a model
could be made more robust to a direct reinforcement learning attack
by retraining on adversarial examples. However, we note that these
results are dataset and model dependent, and leave a thorough
study of model hardening to future work. Generally, we found that
many of the engines in VirusTotal were susceptible to static changes
in the malware, whether made by the targeted agent, or just by
random mutations.
Evasion rates by this RL approach appear to be exceeded by
other approaches for attacking machine learning models in infor-
mation security, broadly, in which the attacker has more knowledge
about the model under attack. We believe, however, that our novel
approach best mimics real-world conditions, in which an attacker
may have only API access to a model that reports malicious or be-
nign (for example, machine learning models hosted on VirusTotal).
This represents the most difficult scenario for an attacker. If one
assumes that our automated adversary is equally or more capable
than attackers in the wild, then this approach represents a gen-
uinely valuable means for generating evasive variants for studying
model weaknesses or for adversarial training.
Although this work lays the groundwork for generating eva-
sive variants for black-box attacks, we have also outlined some
corner-cases that represent points of failure. In particular, in some
cases, “functionality-preserving” mutations actually break the PE
file format due to parsing issues related to uncommon practices or
intentional obfuscation techniques used by malware. In addition,
care must be taken when retraining on adversarial examples gener-
ated by this approach, since these samples may be idiosyncratic in
ways unrelated to malicious vs. benign. (In essence, one could actu-
ally begin to poison ones own dataset via adversarial training.) We
leave these important issues for future work, and as a cautionary
tales to other researchers.
Lastly, we have provided open source code at https://github.
com/endgameinc/gym-malware. We believe that there is significant
room for improvement in this approach, and encourage researchers
to contribute. Specifically, researchers may find interest in enriching
the environment with additional functionality-preserving muta-
tions, improving the reinforcement learning agents used for attack
(the purpose of the gym framework), and especially for industry
researchers, directing their own agents to attack their own machine
learning models.
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